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CASE COMMENTS

The principal case well recognizes that judicial review of the
decisions of administrative agencies is limited, not only by the
definitions contained in the act, but also by policies adopted by
the courts. These limitations on review do not appear to have
created significant problems incident to due process of law requirements. Other issues on judicial review of administrative
action under the West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act
are certain to arise, 8 but the court's decision in the principal case
will serve well to shape the pattern of judicial review in this
jurisdiction.
Paul Robert Rice

Attorney and Client-Acts of Real Estate Broker Constituting
Unauthorized Practice of Law
D, a corporate real estate brokerage firm, was filling in
earnest money contract forms and securing thereto signatures of
buyers and sellers of real property. The D was also using and
preparing form deeds and other instruments necessary to clear or
transfer title. The forms used had been composed by lawyers.
P, the Chicago Bar Association, sought to enjoin the alleged unauthorized practice of law. The circuit court found the forms
used in the initial contracts were a necessary incident to the real
estate business, but held that the use of forms in the preparation
of deeds and other subsequent instruments constituted an unauthorized practice of law. The appellate court held that neither
the initial contracts nor the subsequent deeds and related instruments could be filled in by D. Held, appellate court affirmed
in part and reversed in part; circuit court affirmed. A real estate
broker may properly fill in the usual form of earnest money contract or offer to purchase where such involves merely supplying
of factual data, but the drawing or filling in of blanks on deeds,
mortgages and other legal instruments subsequently executed
requires the peculiar skill of an attorney and constitutes the
practice of law. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 214
N.E.2d 771 (Ill. 1966).
The question of what real estate services require the skill
peculiar to one trained and experienced in the law had been
38

Harrison, supra note 1, at 190.
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answered differently in various jurisdictions.' However, nearly
all decisions recognize that the exclusion of all but attorneys from
the practice of law is in the public interest. The purpose of the
exclusion is to guarantee that the public has the benefit of
competent and unbiased legal advice.'
In holding that the real estate broker could not prepare or draft
any contracts or fill in any form contracts or form deeds, the
appellate court and the dissenting opinion of the supreme court
in the principal case, reasoned that only an attorney possesses the
necessary skill and expertise to assure the legal validity of such
transactions. The appellate court stated several times in its opinion
that public interest was the basis for its decision.'
In 1943 the American Bar Association and the National Association of Real Estate Boards adopted a Statement of Principles
which was widely distributed throughout real estate circles. The
following is an excerpt from the circular: "The Realtor shall not
practice law or give legal advice directly or indirectly; he shall
not act as a public conveyancer, nor give advice or opinions as
to the legal effect of legal instruments

. .

.

"'

The holding in the

principal case is in keeping with the spirit of the coordinated
efforts of these two organizations.'
One distinct trend of cases has reasoned that, if the activity
alleged to be practicing law is incident to the real estate business,
public convenience demands that the activity not be considered
an unauthorized practice of law.6 The "incident theory" recognizes that certain areas of the commercial and legal fields overlap
and can be concurrently performed by both. But, in these cases
the courts are still left with the problem of deciding what activities
are, in fact, incident to the real estate business. In solving this
problem, the courts have held: (1) both the initial contracts and
IAnnot., 53 A.L.R.2d 788 (1957).
Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951); State
ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 131 Neb. 294, 268 N.W. 95 (1936).
2

' Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 31 Ill. App. 2d 575, 203

N.E.2d
131 (1964).
4
AEA CoN, rrrX ON UNAUrHoRizED PRAcTIcE OF LAw, A STUDY OF
UNAUTHRIomZD PRAcTCE OF LAw 32 (Sept. 1951).
5 It must be pointed out that the Canons of Professional Ethics are

violated by the lawyer who drafts a form contract or form deed used by a
real estate broker if the broker is practicing law in completing the forms.
Canon 47, ABA, CA~oNs OF PROFssIONAL ETmcs.
' Ingham County Bar Ass'n v. Wather Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69
N.W.2d 713 (1955); Cowen v. Nelson, 207 Minn. 642, 290 N.W. 795 (1940).
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the subsequent deeds are incident;7 (2) only the initial contracts
are incident;8 or (3) neither the initial contracts nor the subsequent deeds are incident.9
In considering form contracts specifically, most of the decisions
have concluded that filling in of factual data in a form type
contract is a simple activity requiring no more than clerical
knowledge and ability, and as such, would not constitute the practice of law. ' ° A survey of decisions made in the past decade
disclosed a majority of the cases concurring with the decision
in the principal case, i.e., permitting real estate brokers to fill in
form contracts in their initial transactions."
No case similar to the principal case has been before the West
Virginia court. However, under its inherent power, the West
Virginia Supreme Court has adopted, and revised, a definition
of the "practice of law." Briefly stated, the court has said that
one not a lawyer is participating in the unauthorized practice of
law if, with or without compensation, he (1) gives advice on
legal matters, (2) prepares legal instruments for another, or (3)
represents another before a judicial or administrative tribunal
which will reach a legal conclusion. Such activities will be unauthorized practice of law whether or not related to another
activity. 2 This definition appears to be the only expression of
the court concerning the preparation of legal instruments. The
definition appears to leave the court with a future decision as to
whether or not "prepare" includes filling in blank contracts.
It may be that the definition, standing alone, may prohibit the
brokers from preparing deeds, deeds of trust or release deeds.
If the language in the definition be not conclusive on this point,
one may reflect briefly on the purpose of the 1965 legislature in
requiring the drafter of a deed to annex his name thereto. 3 The
question which remains unanswered is whether real estate brokers
7

Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855
8Keyes Co. v. Dade County Bar Ass'n, 46 So.2d(1952).
605 (Fla. 1950).
9 Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Quinlan & Tyson, Inc., 31 IMI.App. 2d 575, 203

N.E.2d
131 (1964).
10
Gustafson v. V. C. Taylor & Sons, Inc., 138 Ohio St. 392, 35 N.E.2d

435 (1941).
1 Indiana State Bar Ass'n v. Indiana Real Estate Ass'n, 244 Ind. 214,
191 N.E.2d 711 (1963); State Bar of Michigan v. Kupris, 366 Mich. 688,
116 N.W.2d
341 (1962).
1
2 Definition of the Practice of Law, app. to W. VA. Sup. CT. R., in
W. VA. CODE at 371-72 (Michie 1966).
13 W. VA. CoDE: ch. 39, art. 1, § 2(a) (Michie 1966).
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in West Virginia may use form contracts in their initial transactions.
By stating it is irrelevant that the instrument prepared is connected to another activity, 4 the West Virginia court seems to be
saying that the "incident theory" will not be recognized. But the
court, in discussing the completion of Workmen's Compensation
forms in West Virginia State Bar v. Earley,"5 noted that "the
completion of such blank forms does not require any knowledge
and skill beyond that possessed by the ordinarily experienced and
intelligent layman ...."

This reasoning is similar to that used

by the Illinois court in the principal case and it could provide the
basis for a holding by the West Virginia court that no unusual
skill or knowledge is required in filling out forms for the initial
real estate transactions. Indirectly, this would be recognizing
the "incident theory."
In Commonwealth v. Jones & Robins, Inc.,"7 the Virginia court

held that a real estate broker was not engaged in the practice of
law when he prepared, drafted or used simple contracts of sale
as an incident of the regular course of his business, but that the
drafting of deeds, deeds of trust, mortgages and release deeds
was not incident to his business and was in fact practicing law.
The Virginia court defines the practice of law as: "with or without compensation, to prepare for another legal instrument of any
character, other than notices or contracts incident to the regular
course of conducting a licensed business."" It is unlikely that
the Virginia court would have arrived at the same decision had
that tribunal been construing the corresponding part of the West
Virginia definition which provides that one is practicing law when
"one undertakes, with or without compensation and whether or
not in connection with another activity, to prepare for another
legal instrument of any character." 9 Thus, it appears that the
West Virginia court, if it were to strictly apply its definition of
the "practice of law," would require the initial contracts in a real
estate transaction to be prepared completely by a lawyer.
Note 12 supra.

14

144 W. Va. 504, 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959).
,6 d. at 526, 109 S.E.2d at 434.
15

7

186 Va. 30, 41 S.E.2d 720 (1947).

' VA. SuP. CT. R., 171 Va. XVII (1938). (Emphasis added.)
19 Appendix to W. VA. Sup. CT. R. at 371.
(Emphasis added.)
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The principal case represents the modem tendency, to permit
real estate brokers to complete form contracts in their initial transactions while restricting the preparation of deeds and other subsequent documents to lawyers. This approach attempts to balance
the public interest and public convenience. However, the West
Virginia court's definition of "practice of law" obviously indicates
that its primary concern is the protection of the public. Whether
the West Virginia court will follow the principal case appears
to depend on a future determination, based on Earley, whether
"prepares legal instruments" includes a mere filling in of factual
data in form contracts and must be completed by an attorney.
K. Paul Davis

Conflict of Laws-Long Arm Statutes-Sufficient Minimum Contact
for In Personam Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations
D, a corporation, loaded goods on a railroad car in California
destined for South Dakota. D2, a corporation, was in charge of
transporting the goods from California to Kansas where they
were placed on another carrier for transport to South Dakota.
Therefore, D2 had no contracts within South Dakota. P was injured
in South Dakota while unloading the goods. The injury was
caused by the alleged negligent loading and transporting of the
goods which occurred outside the State of South Dakota. P
brought an action against D1 and D2 for the injuries received in
South Dakota under South Dakota's "long arm" statute. The
statute provides that when a foreign corporation commits a tort
"in whole or in part" in South Dakota, against a resident, such
corporation will be subject to in personam jurisdiction. D1 and D2
moved to quash South Dakota's jurisdiction on the grounds that
they could not be reached under South Dakota's "long arm" statute.
Held, motions granted as to both D1 and D2 but with leave to
amend in respect to D1. Although the injury occurred within
South Dakota, the evidence failed to show that any of the events
in the causal chain leading to the injury occurred within that
state. Consequently, D1 and D2 did not have sufficient minimum
contacts to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process.
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